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General description of Chernobyl accident is given in the review. The accident causes are brieﬂy
described. Special attention is paid to radiation situation after the accident and radiation measurements
problems. Some data on Chernobyl disaster are compared with the corresponding data on Fukushima
accident. It is noted that Chernobyl and Fukushima lessons should be taken into account while devel-
oping further measures on raising nuclear industry safety.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
During the lifetime of one generation there were 4 major radi-
ation accidents with area contamination in different countries:
 at the atomic plant “Mayak”, USSR, 1957;
 at nuclear power station (NPS) “Three Mile Island”, USA, 1979;
 at Chernobyl NPS, USSR, 1986;
 at NPS “Fukushima”, Japan, 2011.
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident (March, 2011) occurred
during preparation for the 25th anniversary of Chernobyl disaster.
The International Conference devoted to this event took place in
April 2011. Ukraine national report entitled “25 Years after Cher-
nobyl Accident. Safety for the Future” (Baloga, 2011) was prepared.
It considered radio-ecological, radiological, medical, socioeconomicx: þ7 343 375 44 15.
All rights reserved.and social-psychological consequences of the Chernobyl accident
given post-accident period. It was of special interest for the
specialists to compare both accidents and make an attempt to use
the Chernobyl lessons to liquidate the consequences in Fukushima.
This paper is based on the authors’ invited report made at
Fukushima Session of the 7th International Workshop on Ionizing
Radiation Monitoring (December 3e4, 2011, Oarai, Japan). It pres-
ents brief analysis of the causes, consequences and problems of
radiation measurements in the radiation situation which occurred
after Chernobyl nuclear accident. Published materials as well as
personal experience of one of the authors (V. Kortov) being
a participant of the Chernobyl accident elimination
(JulyeSeptember, 1986) as the head of the dosimetric team moni-
toring contaminated areas near the destroyed reactor are used.2. Causes of Chernobyl nuclear accident
The reactor explosion in the 4th Unit of Chernobyl NPS was
caused by design ﬂaws and staff operation errors (Porﬁriev, 1996;
Gorbachev and Solomonov, 2006; Baloga, 2011).
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increase resulting from insertion of control and protection rods into
the reactor core and low speed of reactor protection system oper-
ation. Emergency protection rods were inserted into the reactor
within 18 s (instead of 2e3 s) which prevented the control and
protection system from effective control over fast processes in the
reactor.
The accident occurred during the scheduled tests of power
supply mode in case of external sources loss. This mode was
conceived in the test program and was to be launched if the reactor
capacity dropped by 30% accompanied by emergency cooling
system shut down. In this term there is some similarity with
Fukushima accident, when the emergency cooling systems were
destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami. The Fukushima reactors,
however, were shut down immediately after the ﬁrst shook of the
earthquake. The Chernobyl staff in absence of the emergency
cooling lowered the reactor capacity down to inadmissible low
level (20% from the nominal capacity). Constructional and physical
characteristics of RBMK-1000 reactor did not allow the staff to
effectively control its work at such low capacity. However,
(Summary Report, 1986) the scheduled tests were completed and
the staff received the command to shut down the reactor. It was this
scheduled procedure that appeared to be the accident cause. The
insertion of the protection rods into the reactor core at low reac-
tivity level did not bring the reactor to a halt. On the contrary, it led
to sharp increase in reactivity, reactor power growth and fast
heating of the reactor active zone which caused the explosion. The
photo picture of the explosion destroyed part of the reactor core
and reactor building at Chernobyl is shown in Fig. 1.Fig. 1. Photo of the destroyed reactor at Chernobyl NPS.3. Radiation situation and problems of radiation
measurements
Explosions and ejection of radioactive substances and ﬁre lasted
for 10 days. The active zone of reactor was damaged and nuclear
fuel was melted as shown in Fig. 2. 70 tons of nuclear fuel was
ejected by the exploded reactor. Another 50 tons of nuclear fuel and
800 tons of graphite burned down in the destroyed reactor.
The exploded reactor created the dose level of g-radiation about
300 Sv/h (Tarasenko, 2011).
The dose rate within 10 days (6th May 1986) after the accident
was the following:
- at distance of 150 m away from the reactor e 12 Gy/h;
- in Pripyat1e10mGy/h (air), on roadse asphalt up to 600mGy/
h, soil up to 200 mGy/h.
Three months later (26th July 1986) the dose rate at distance of
150 m away from the ruins of the 4th Unit of Chernobyl NPS was
more than 3 Gy/h.
Near the reactor and within the 30 km zone away from it the
maximum dose rate for liquidators’ work and staying was
250 mGy/h and the everyday dose rate had to be less than 20 mGy/
h.
The part of the reactor core which was ejected by explosion had
formed a radioactive cloud which moved at heights from one to
11 km (Medvedev, 1989). The cloud was moving to north-west
across Belarus and Baltic states crossing the USSR’s borders.
Huge territories of former USSR with a population of 945,000
people were polluted.1 Pripyat was the town of about 50,000 people near Chernobyl NPS, in which the
staff of station, builders and workers of service centers lived.Falls from contaminated clouds caused the appearance of zones
with excessive radioactive pollution in Sweden, Finland, Germany,
Austria, Switzerland and other countries. Many people who lived in
cities Pripyat, Chernobyl and other settlements 20e30 km from
Chernobyl NPS were evacuated (Abogjan et al., 1986).
Let us consider the problems of radiation measurements in the
radiation situation mentioned above.
3.1. Absence of necessary equipment
There was no supposition that for reactors of RBMK-1000 type
such large-scale accident with a complete destruction of the core
was possible. For this reason therewas no necessary dosimetric and
radiometric equipment allowing to estimate radiation situation
near the reactor immediately after the accident under conditions of
high dose rate. It led to the late assessment of the accident scale. It
also was the cause of absence of the necessary protective outﬁt for
the ﬁremenworking on the 4th Unit. As a result, many of them died
from the acute radiation disease (Baloga, 2011).
After the reactor explosion radioactive nuclides were forming
very violent ﬁelds of mixed a þ b þ g radiation. There was no
control equipment able to measure mixed radiation.
Table 2
Diversity of data registered by means of different types of dosimeters in the same
place of Chernobyl area.
Type of dosimeter Number of
dosimeters
Registered data
(mGy/h)
ID-02 4 2.57
DK-02 4 2.34
Victoreen-541L (USA) 5 1.68
Clinical dosimeter 27012 (DDR) 1 4.49
DP-5W 1 0.85
Table 3
Isotopic composition of soil sample at distance of 3 km from the
destroyed reactor.
Radionuclides Activity AT Bq/kg
141Ce 0.45$105
Fig. 2. Floats of fuel-containing substances under reactor.
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During the liquidation of the accident’s consequences at the
Chernobyl NPS various detectorswere used: ionized chambers, gas-
discharge counters and TLDs (Table 1). This detectors had different
thickness and density of casing. Therefore they had different
sensitivity degrees to b-radiation (Tarasenko, 2011).
3.3. Big diversity of measured data
The comparison of the registered data in the same place of
Chernobyl area shows that under the high-intensity b-radiation
there was a big diversity of measured values obtained fromTable 1
Some types of dosimeters and detectors used after Chernobyl accident.
Type of dosimeter Detector Dose range
DR-5M Gas-discharge counter 0e2 Gy/h
ID-11 RP 0e15 Gy/h
Victoreen-541L Ionized chamber 0e2 mGy
KDT-02 TLD-400 0.1e10 Gy
DP-22B Ionized chamber 0e0.5 Gy
ID-1 Ionized chamber 0e5 mGy
Victoreen-47A Ionized chamber 0e10 Gy/hdifferent detectors because of the variation in casing thickness and
density as listed in Table 2.
The difference of the registered data can mount to 300%. Special
measures were needed to calibrate the dosimetric instruments.
3.4. Complicated composition of isotopes
A mixture of radioactive sources created by various isotopes
accounted for a radiation level in area of Chernobyl NPS as listed in
Table 3. This table shows the measurements data of spectrum
analyses of soil sample (01.08.1986). One can see that many
radionuclides formed during and after the accident. The isotopic
composition varied with time.
According to the calculations made, contribution of beta-
radiation to the readings of dosimeters with radiation case thick-
ness of 0.3e0.625 g/cm3 depending on the post-accident time
period can change 20e60-fold due to the isotopic composition of
radionuclides (Tarasenko, 2011). Moreover, as time passes contri-
bution of b-particles with energy less than 0.5 MeV to the absorbed
dose increases.
3.5. Change of b-radiation contribution to radiation status
An increase of contribution ratio of gþ b radiation to g-radiation
was observed during the long (about a year) period, due to changes
of radioactive nuclides composition because of the short-lived
isotopes break-up (Fig. 3). That caused a rise of b-radiation part in
mixed g þ b radiation ﬁelds.
It was found that due to the high contribution of b-radiation
radiological exposure on the accident liquidators’ skinwas tens and
hundreds times higher than radiation exposure of other parts of
human body. Regarding this, in the work (Tarasenko, 2011) it is
offered to ban the usage of themeansmeasuring exposure dose and
dose rate under conditions of mixed ionizing radiation effect after
accidents.58
131I53 0.43$102
103Pu44 0.52$105
106Ru44 0.57$105
134Cs55 0.7$104
137Cs55 0.15$105
95Zr40 0.13$106
140Ba56 0.17$104
144Ce58 0.19$106
103mRh45 0.52$105
144Pr59 0.19$106
140La57 0.19$104
95Nb41 0.22$106
In all, AT 0.10$107
Fig. 3. Dependence of ratio Pgþb/Pg on time after Chernobyl accident.
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First of all, it should be noted that the accidents at Chernobyl
and Fukushima have different causes. The causes of the accident at
Chernobyl NPS are described above. The accident at the Fukushima
NPS is due to loss of cooling reactors and ponds for spent nuclear
fuel (Strishov, 2011). The earthquake destroyed the system of
stationary power supplies of NPS. Giant tsunami damaged the
emergency power supply located near the ocean. A large amount of
steam was created under conditions of insufﬁcient cooling of the
reactors. The interaction of steam with parts of the reactors con-
taining zirconium led to the formation of a hydrogen and oxygen
mixture and its explosion. Explosions and ﬁres destroyed the upper
part of the reactors buildings, there was a release of radioactive
substances into the atmosphere (Chernikov, 2011; Machi, 2012).
The composition of radioactive releases was also different. The
accident at the Chernobyl NPS was accompanied by the release of
irradiated nuclear fuel solid particles and ﬁssion products (“hot”
particles) with different isotopic composition. The accident at the
Fukushima NPS was accompanied largely by the release of volatile
isotopes, in particular, isotopes of iodine and cesium (Chernikov,
2011). Effect of b and a-radiation on the radiation situation was
not so strong compared to the accident at Chernobyl.
The consequences of accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima can
be compared on the following indices (Israel et al., 1990; Machi,
2012):
1. Release of radioactive substances into the atmosphere:
5.2$1018 Bq (Chernobyl) and 6.3$1017 Bq (Fukushima).
2. Contamination of the territories of their countries:
450,000 km2 (Chernobyl) and 8000 km2 (Fukushima).
3. Contamination of the territory of other countries: 250,000 km2
in Western Europe (Chernobyl). The accident at the Fukushima
NPS did not cause pollution in other countries.
4. The area of evacuation: 10,800 km2 (Chernobyl) and 1100 km2
(Fukushima).
 Evacuation of the population: 400,000 people (Chernobyl)
and 83,000 (Fukushima).
 Loss of lives from the acute radiation disease within 4
months after the accident: 28 (Chernobyl) and
0 (Fukushima).The above brief comparison shows that the scale of the accident
at the Chernobyl NPS is about 10 times greater than the scale of the
accident at the Fukushima NPS (Machi, 2012). The accident at the
Chernobyl NPS was international disaster with pollution in other
countries. The pollution at the Fukushima NPS accident is limited to
the areas within Japan.
Note also that the release of radioactive substances and radia-
tion situation in the polluted areas within 30 km zone of Chernobyl
NPS caused grave consequences for the health of the liquidators.
The results of exposure to b-radiation were: “nuclear sunburn” e
skin blackening of faces and hands of the ﬁrst liquidators and
“nuclear quinsy” e continuous hoarse cough due to throat and
bronchia burn (Medvedev, 1989; Tarasenko, 2011)5. Main measures for the liquidation of accident
consequences at Chernobyl NPS
More than 15,000 tons of different materials (lead, carbide of
boron, dolomite, sand, etc) were dropped from helicopters in the
destroyed reactor for prevention of nuclear reaction and localiza-
tion of ejecting sources of radioactive substances.
The sarcophagus (shelter) was built within the extremely short
time (6 months) in the conditions of high level radiation. Wide
complex of works on the decontamination of NPS territory and the
surrounding area was carried out. After decontamination a part of
forests and agricultural lands is suitable for use. Enormous
measures were taken for the decontamination of water sources and
for supply of population with clean water. Social protection for
liquidators and people who lived in contaminated areas was
provided, and regular monitoring of their health was organized.
Unfortunately, the territory of Chernobyl NPS, the cities Pripyat,
Chernobyl and the surrounding area within 30 km zone have been
closed over a long period of time. Pripyat is now a ghost city. The
streets are overgrown with trees, buildings are destroyed.
There are the problems of shelter (Fig. 4). The shelter erection
was an important event in stabilization of radiation situation near
the destroyed reactor. The shelter however was not able to solve
a set of problems connected with the ecologically safe system of
environmental protection from the radioactive pollution caused by
destroyed reactor.
According to the calculated data, inside the shelter there is still
about 95% of the irradiated nuclear fuel (Krupny, 1996). It is found
in the fragments of the reactor core, in the fuel dust and in the lava
materials. Total activity of radionuclides inside the shelter at
present is about 4.8$1017 Bq (Baloga, 2011). Radiation hazard is
presented by aerosols responsible for air pollution inside as well as
outside the shelter. There are still rooms inside the shelter where
expose dose rate is over 10 Gy/h, though in most rooms it does not
exceed 10 mGy/h. Some aerosols leak through crevices and tech-
nical hatches in the shelter forming “unexpected” radioactivity
release. As a result, expose dose rate 150m from the shelter is about
0.15 mGy/h (detected by V. Kortov 26.04.2011) which is 1000 times
as much as natural background.
The tons of radioactive dust accumulated inside the shelter not
only pollute the environment, but are also the source of potential
danger. The dust atmosphere with particles of the submicrometer
size behaves like liquid in which heavier particles (Pu-239, Pu-241,
U-235) precipitate in the lower rooms of the shelter. As a result high
concentrations of ﬁssionable nuclear materials can form sponta-
neously, which can cause explosion. Such example with radioactive
waste explosion at the nuclear enterprise “Mayak” (USSR, 1957) is
known. Regarding this, conﬁnement over the shelter is planned to
be constructed in the near future, which is of great value and will
help to reduce the danger. However, the main function of the
Fig. 4. Photo of Chernobyl reactor shelter (April, 2011).
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ﬁssionable materials from the 4th Unit of the Chernobyl NPS.
As is known, at present the construction of the shelter over the
destroyed reactor unit N1 in Fukushima NPS is being completed
(Machi, 2012). Hopefully, the experience of shelter construction for
Unit N4 of the Chernobyl NPS will be taken into account by the
Japanese specialists who are to clear the destroyed reactor from the
ﬁssionable materials and radioactive fragments of the reactor core
within the shortest time possible.
6. Conclusion
The operators working with RBMK-1000 reactor were not
informed of its ﬂaws. The process operator guide and work manual
did not contain information on the reactor operation restrictions.
This situation was due to the secrecy order of the Soviet nuclear
science and industry. The latter was completely concealed from the
international and national public control. Such isolation led to the
weakness of the Soviet nuclear industry in a number of signiﬁcant
radiation safety issues, and to the absence of what is called “safety
culture” (Baloga, 2011).
The Chernobyl accident was a hard blow to the NPS prestige and
slowed down its development signiﬁcantly.
Consequences of major NPS accidents can be much more than
a national problem and may cause global catastrophe. The accident
is accompanied by many consequences which require a long time
and enormous ﬁnancial resources to liquidate them.
The Chernobyl accident has shown that a creation and main-
taining of an effective emergency system for personnel andtechnical departments of NPS and, especially, for dosimetric
departments are necessary. Reliable and timely information allows
to take actions needed to minimize the consequences of accidents
and protect people from irradiation.
Modern society is not able to refuse nuclear power use. The
Chernobyl memories oblige people to be responsible for and careful
in hazardous technologies usage. It is impossible to use nuclear
power without scientiﬁc and technological support, highly-
qualiﬁed staff training system, multilevel system of responsibili-
ties and decision-making, safety culture development.References
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